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ABSTRACT 
 
Earnings management is the practice of deriving certain benefits by intervening in external financial reporting or 
misleading certain stakeholders through adjustments to accruals without cash flow involvement or with affecting 
cash flows through real activities. Using the models of Kothari et al. (2005) and Cohen et al. (2008) for accrual-
based earnings management (AEM) and real activities earnings management (REM), respectively, we examined 
whether relationships exist between key financial indicators, such as cash flows from operations, operating income, 
and debt dependency level, and AEM and REM in the ready mixed concrete (RMC) industry in Korea. This study is 
the first to investigate earnings management in Korea’s RMC sector. Results showed that operating income and 
cash flows from operations are significantly negatively related to AEM and REM, consistent with the findings of 
previous research. By contrast, debt dependency exhibits no significant relationship with AEM and REM, 
contradicting the findings of most previous studies. As a moderating variable, operating income affects the 
relationship between cash flows from operations and earnings management with only REM. On these bases, we can 
infer that earnings management in the Korean RMC industry responds differently to key financial indicators with 
regards to AEM and REM practice. Overall, companies in the industry implement aggressive earnings management 
depending on operating income and cash generation ability level rather than debt dependency level. These findings 
provide important insights for people who are interested in accounting information on the RMC industry in Korea. 
 
Keywords: Ready Mixed Concrete Industry; Operating Income; Cash Flow From Operating Activities; Debts 
Dependency; Earnings Management 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
arnings management has been defined differently by researchers. Healey and Warren (1999), for 
example, stated that it is the exercise of judgment in financial reporting and transaction for the purpose 
of misleading certain stakeholders regarding the financial performance of a company or achieving 
target contractual outcomes on the basis of reported financial data. Schipper (1989) defined it as “disclosure 
management,” which is intended to realize private gains by purposefully intervening in external financial reporting. 
 
Two methods of earnings management are used. The first is accrual-based earnings management (AEM), in which 
accruals in accounting records are adjusted without cash flow involvement, and the second is real earnings 
management (REM), wherein actual expenses and cash flows are reduced or production costs are managed (Nekhili 
et al., 2016; Park, 2016, 2012). Cohen et al. (2008) stated that after the Sarbanes–Oxley Law was introduced, 
companies have been shifting from AEM to REM as a means of managing their earnings. Zang (2012) found that 
managers switch between the two methods depending on their relative costs, with these executives favoring real 
activities manipulation and AEM as substitute approaches. Previous studies tended to focus on measuring earnings 
adjustment in AEM, but recent years have seen increased concentration on REM given the strengthening of 
accounting regulations. 
 
Various financial indicators, including cash flows from operations, operating income, liability to equity ratio, debt 
dependency level, free cash flows, leverage, and liquidity ratio, are associated with earnings management (Nekhili et 
al., 2016; Kim & Lee, 2015; Kim et al., 2011; Park et al., 2002; Hue, 2009). Companies with low cash flows from 
E 
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operations aggressively implement AEM and REM, whereas enterprises with high cash flows from operations 
practice the opposite (Park et al., 2002); Dechow et al., 1995; DeFond and Subramanyam, 1998). Operating income 
is negatively related to earnings management (Yoon & Miller, 2003; Hue 2009).  
 
When a company has a high liability to equity ratio or high debt dependency, it tends to implement upward earnings 
management (Sercu et al., 2006; Lee, 2005; Fung & Goodwin, 2013; Choi, 2008). The current research verifies 
whether the same tendency occurs in the ready mixed concrete (RMC) industry in Korea by using the AEM and 
REM models proposed by Kothari et al. (2005) and Cohen et al. (2008), respectively. We focus on the relationships 
between key financial indicators, namely, cash flows from operations, operating income, and debt dependency level, 
and AEM and REM. We also examine whether operating income, as a moderating variable, affects the relationship 
between cash flows from operations and earnings management. Most RMC companies in Korea are small and 
medium-sized enterprises and thus suffer from a limited capacity to access the capital market. These companies 
depend primarily on loans from private financial institutions, mainly banks. Under this backdrop, RMC companies 
are driven to implement upward earnings management to reduce borrowing costs and qualify for additional loans 
from banks. To demonstrate their repayment capability, they are compelled to prove their ability to generate 
operating cash flows to financial institutions. Similar to other construction industries, the RMC sector is an order-
based industry. For a company to secure orders and become a supplier of construction companies, it needs to 
implement upward earnings management to ensure that operational performance enables the generation of operating 
income or cash flows from operations. No evidence has been provided as to whether earnings management in the 
RMC industry exhibits a pattern similar to that in other industries. Therefore, obtaining empirical evidence on the 
relationship between key financial indicators and earnings management in this sector offers very important 
implications. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is a review of the literature on earnings management and 
related financial indicators. It also presents the arguments that underlie our hypotheses. Section 3 discusses our 
research methodology, and Section 4 describes the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this work, the 
correlations that we derived, and the results of an empirical test. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1 Cash Flows from Operations, Operating Income, and Earnings Management 
 
Previous research generally indicates a negative relationship between operating cash flows and earnings 
management. As representative studies, Dechow et al. (1995) and DeFond and Subramanyam (1998) confirmed a 
negative significant relationship between operating cash flows and AEM. Kim and Lee (2015) investigated earnings 
management in the construction waste disposal industry in Korea, also with a focus on operating cash flows. The 
authors reported that cash flows from operations are negatively related to earnings management and that low 
operating cash flows therefore drive increased upward earnings management in AEM and REM. Kim et al. (2011) 
stated that more discretionary accruals (DAs) are implemented under negative operating cash flows than under 
positive operating cash flows. Similar findings were presented by Hue (2009) and Yoon and Miller (2002).  Hue 
reported that a company with negative operating cash flows and a positive operating income tends to perform more 
DAs than a company with negative operating cash flows and a negative operating income. This finding implies that 
operating income exerts a certain effect on the relationship between cash flows from operations and earnings 
management. Yoon and Miller explained that when operating performance is poor, firms tend to choose income-
increasing strategies. That is, the lower a company’s operating income, the stronger the tendency toward upward 
earnings management. On the basis of these studies, we formulate the following hypotheses for RMC companies in 
Korea: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Earnings management via AEM and REM will decrease with level of operating income. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Earnings management via AEM and REM will decrease with level of cash flows from operations. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Operating income level will affect the relationship between cash flows from operations and earnings 
management via AEM and REM.  
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2.2 Debt Dependency and Earnings Management 
 
Most previous studies showed a statistically positive relationship between leverage (debt dependency level: total 
debts divided by sum of total liabilities and total shareholders’ equities) and earnings management, indicating that 
high-leverage companies favor upward earnings management. Fung and Goodwin (2013) found that short-term debt 
is positively associated with AEM (measured by DAs). Park and Cho (2013) examined the effects of additional 
borrowing and debt ratio on earnings management for non-listed SMEs. The authors found that the larger the scale 
of additional debt and the higher the total debt ratio, the stronger the tendency of companies to opt for upward 
earnings management. In classifying a corporation’s liabilities into trade-related liabilities and debts from banks, 
Sercu et al. (2006) found that earnings management is more significantly related to bank debts than trade-related 
liabilities. In the Australian context, Jones (2001) demonstrated that old-economy firms engage in significant 
earnings management, which is positively associated with leverage. Kim and Lee (2015) showed that the Korean 
construction waste disposal industry is characterized by a positive relationship between debt dependency level and 
earnings management. Kim and Bae (2008) pointed out that unlisted SMEs are more likely to rely on loans from 
financial institutions, such as banks, for their financing needs and are more likely to implement upward earnings 
managements to avoid reporting losses from the loans that they derive from financial institutions. We expect the 
same relationship to occur in Korea’s RMC industry and accordingly formulate the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Earnings management via AEM and REM will increase with level of debt dependency. 
 
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Sample Selection 
 
The sample consisted of Korean RMC companies that disclose their financial conditions in the DART system of the 
Korean Financial Supervisory Service’s website. We excluded firms that engage in businesses other than RMC for 
data purity and those whose annual financial data span a period of less than eight years. The data obtained from the 
sample comprised eight-year annual data covering 2008 to 2015. The final dataset consisted of 176 firm-year 
observations. 
 
3.2 Definition and Measurement of Variables 
 
3.2.1 Measuring Accrual-Based Earnings Management 
 
We used DAs as a proxy for AEM. DAs represent unexplained accruals, which are calculated by subtracting 
estimated normal accruals from total accruals. Kothari et al. (2005) developed a performance-matched DA measure 
by using the revised Jones (1991) model to control performance effects in the estimation of DAs. The authors used 
ROA as a variable of performance to control the overestimation of DAs. In the present research, the coefficients of 
total accruals were calculated by using equation (1) in regression. We then estimated DAs by subtracting normal 
accruals from total accruals by using equation (2). We also used DAs as a measure of AEM by using Kothari et al.’s 
model as follows: 
 !"#"#$% = 𝛼( + 𝛽+ +"#$% + 𝛽, ∆.#/∆"0#"#$% + 𝛽1 223#"#$% + 𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴8 + 𝜀8 (1) 
 
 𝐷𝐴8 = !"#"#$% − 𝛼( + 𝛽+ +"#$% + 𝛽, ∆.#/∆"0#"#$% + 𝛽1 223#"#$% + 𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴8  (2) 
 
 𝑇𝐴8: Year t Total Accrual (Net Income - CFO) 𝐷𝐴8: Year t Discretionary Accruals 𝐴8/+: Year t-1 Total Assets ∆𝑆8: Year t Sales Change ∆𝐴𝑅8: Year t AR Change 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – March/April 2017 Volume 33, Number 2 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 332 The Clute Institute 
𝑃𝑃𝐸8: Year t Plant, Properties and Equipment - net 𝑅𝑂𝐴8: Year t Return on Total Assets (Net Income / Year t-1 Total Assets) 𝜀8: Year t Residual 
 
3.2.2 Measuring Real Activities-Based Earnings Management 
 
We used the REM model proposed by Cohen et al. (2008), who developed an integrated real earnings management 
measure that is similar to equation (3) by combining abnormal cash flows (ACFO), abnormal production costs 
(APC) and abnormal selling, and general and administrative expenses (ASGA). The authors combined these 
elements to verify the level of real earnings management implemented by corporations. The signs of ACFO and 
ASGA are opposite to that of APC. Real earnings management occurs when ACFO and ASGA decrease and when 
APC increases. 
 𝑅𝐸𝑀 = +1 𝑋 − 𝐴𝐶𝐹𝑂 + + 𝐴𝑃𝐶 + − 𝐴𝑆𝐺𝐴  (3) 
 
Roychowdhury (2006) developed a representative real earnings management model that considers ACFO, APC, and 
ASGA as measures of real activities that are subjected to earnings management.  
 
ACFO from operating activities are price discounts and credit sales by enabling the relaxation of credit control. 
ACFO is used to measure abnormal cash flows by comparing increases in sales and increases in cash flows. 
Roychowdhury developed equations (4) and (5) on the basis of Dechow et al.’s (1998) model, in which normal cash 
flows from operations are assumed to have a linear relationship with sales changes. He estimated the coefficients of 
equation (4) and calculated ACFO by subtracting normal cash flows from operations from total cash flows from 
operations, as in equation (5). The calculation is presented below: 
 FGH#"#$% = 𝛼( + 𝛽+ +"#$% + 𝛽, .#"#$% + 𝛽1 ∆.#"#$% + 𝜀8 (4) 
 
 "FGH#"#$% = FGH#"#$% − 𝛼( + 𝛽+ +"#$% + 𝛽, .#"#$% + 𝛽1 ∆.#"#$%  (5) 
 
 𝐶𝐹𝑂8: Year t Actual Cash Flow from Operations 𝐴𝐶𝐹𝑂8: Year t Abnormal Cash Flow from Operations 𝑆8: Year t Sales ∆𝑆8: Year t Sales Change 𝐴8/+: Year t-1 Total Assets 𝜀8: Year t Residual 
 
APC is used to examine whether a corporation increases or decreases production quantities to perform earnings 
management that is based on the adjustment of the costs of goods sold. Roychowdhury (2006) used equation (6) to 
estimate coefficients and total production costs based on normal sales changes and production cost relationships. He 
then calculated APC by using equation (7) to subtract normal production costs from total production costs. 
 2F#"#$% = 𝛼( + 𝛽+ +"#$% + 𝛽, .#"#$% + 𝛽1 ∆.#"#$% + 𝛽4 ∆.#$%"#$% + 𝜀8 (6) 
 
 "2F#"#$% = 2F#"#$% − 𝛼( + 𝛽+ +"#$% + 𝛽, .#"#$% + 𝛽1 ∆.#"#$% + 𝛽4 ∆.#$%"#$%  (7) 
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𝑃𝐶8: Year t Actual Production Costs (COGS + Inventory Change) 𝐴𝑃𝐶8: Year t Abnormal Production Costs 𝑆8 Year t Sales  ∆𝑆8 Year t Sales Change 𝐴8/+ Year t-1 Total Assets 𝜀8 Year t residual 
 
Abnormal selling and ASGAs are used to measure the effects of real earnings management on the selling and 
ASGAs of management. Generally, management tends to increase or decrease these expenses and thus enables 
earnings management because the expenses are discretionary in nature. Roychowdhury estimated normal 
discretionary expenses by using equation (8), which is based on a linear relationship with sales. He then calculated 
ASGA by subtracting normal SGA from total SGA through equation (9). 
 .I"#"#$% = 𝛼( + 𝛽+ +"#$% + 𝛽, .#"#$% + 𝛽1 .#$%"#$% + 𝜀8 (8) 
 
 ".I"#"#$% = .I"#"#$% − 𝛼( + 𝛽+ +"#$% + 𝛽, .#"#$% + 𝛽1 .#"#$% +  (9) 
 
 𝑆𝐺𝐴8: Year t Actual Discretionary Expenses (SGA) 𝐴𝑆𝐺𝐴8: Year t Abnormal Discretionary Expenses 𝑆8: Year t Sales  𝐴8/+: Year t-1 Total Assets 𝜀8: Year t residual 
 
3.2.3 Control Variables 
 
We used various control variables presented in previous research to reduce statistical error and increase the accuracy 
with which statistical inferences are made (Becker et al., 1998; Ashbaugh et al., 2003; DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994; 
Kasznik ,1999; Kothari et al., 2005, etc.). The specific control variables used in the present study were corporation 
size (SIZE), liabilities and equity ratio (LEV), return on total assets (ROA), growth of total assets (GRW), prior 
year’s total accruals (TA), net losses (LOSS), and year (YEAR). SIZE is a log value of the amount of beginning 
total assets, LEV is derived by dividing total liability by shareholder equity, ROA is obtained by dividing net 
income by beginning total assets, GRW is obtained by dividing ending total assets by beginning total assets, and TA 
is the prior year’s net income minus the prior year’s operating cash flows. For LOSS, we used a dummy variable 
that was assigned a value of 1 for net loss and 0 for net income.  
 
3.3 Research Model 
 
As previously stated, this study examined the relationships between certain key financial indicators and earnings 
management in the RMC industry in Korea. We used equations (10) to (13) for validation. In these equations, we 
used the DA in equation (2) and the REM in equation (3) as proxies for AEM and REM, respectively. The major 
independent variables used were operating cash flows (CFO), operating income (OI), and debt dependency (DEBT). 
OI was used as a moderating variable in examining the relationship between CFO and earnings. CFO was measured 
by dividing CFO by beginning total assets for standardization. OI was measured by dividing it by sales. A high OI is 
preferable because it generally brings more cash to companies. DEBT is the financial ratio of total debts against the 
sum of total liabilities and shareholders’ equities. This ratio is used as an indicator of a company’s financial health 
and profitability. A low DEBT is regarded as favorable from the perspective of financial capital structure.  
 𝐷𝐴J8 or	𝑅𝐸𝑀J8 = 𝛼( + 𝛽+𝐶𝐹𝑂J8 + 𝛽,𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸J8 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐸𝑉J8 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴J8 + 𝛽R𝐺𝑅𝑊J8 + 𝛽T𝑇𝐴J8 +𝛽U𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆J8 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝜀J8W (10) 
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𝐷𝐴J8 or	𝑅𝐸𝑀J8 = 𝛼( + 𝛽+𝑂𝐼J8 + 𝛽,𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸J8 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐸𝑉J8 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴J8 + 𝛽R𝐺𝑅𝑊J8 + 𝛽T𝑇𝐴J8 +𝛽U𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆J8 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝜀J8 (11) 
 𝐷𝐴J8 or	𝑅𝐸𝑀J8 = 𝛼( + 𝛽+𝐶𝐹𝑂J8 + 𝛽,𝑂𝐼J8 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑋𝑂𝐼J8 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸J8 + 𝛽R𝐿𝐸𝑉J8 + 𝛽T𝑅𝑂𝐴J8 +𝛽U𝐺𝑅𝑊J8 + 𝛽X𝑇𝐴J8 + 𝛽Y𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆J8 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝜖J8 (12) 
 𝐷𝐴J8 or	𝑅𝐸𝑀J8 = 𝛼( + 𝛽+𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇J8 + 𝛽,𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸J8 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐸𝑉J8 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑂𝐴J8 + 𝛽R𝐺𝑅𝑊J8 + 𝛽T𝑇𝐴J8 +𝛽U𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆J8 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝜀J8 (13) 
 
Dependent Variables 𝐷𝐴J8: Discretionary accruals based on Kothari et al. (2005) model 𝑅𝐸𝑀J8: Integrated real earnings measurement based on Cohen et al. (2008) and Roychowdhury (2006) 
 
Independent Variables 𝐶𝐹𝑂J8: Cash flow from operations (continuous variable) 𝑂𝐼J8: Operating income (continuous variable) 𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇J8: Debts dependency (continuous variable) 
 
Moderating Variable 𝑂𝐼J8: Dummy variable (for company i and year t, if OI is bigger than average is 1, if not 0 
 
Control Variables 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸J8: Company size 𝐿𝐸𝑉J8: Liabilities to equity Ratio 𝑅𝑂𝐴J8: Total assets return 𝐺𝑅𝑊J8: Total assets growth rate 𝑇𝐴J8: Prior year total accruals 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆J8: Net losses 
Year: Year dummy 
 
4. RESULTS OF EMPIRICAL STUDY 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the major variables used in this study. The mean of the proxies for the 
dependent variables (DA, REM, ACFO, APC, and ASGA) is 0 because these values were estimated by subtracting 
expected values, which were derived from the regression analysis, from actual values. The same mean was reported 
in previous studies. The mean of DA and REM as earnings management proxies is .001, with median values of 
.0133 and .0114, respectively. The positive median indicates that the sample companies implemented earnings 
management via AEM and REM during the analysis period. The minimum and maximum of DA and REM 
distributions are –.49 to .25 and –.20 to .11, respectively, indicating that the DA spread is larger than the REM 
spread. The mean and median of OI as an independent variable are .0478 and .0514, which indicates that the average 
OI percentage for the observations is 4.78%. The mean and median of DEBT (total debts/total liabilities and total 
equities) are .1925 and .1574, respectively, and those of CFO are .0780 and .0589, respectively.  
 
As indicated earlier, the control variables were SIZE, LEV, ROA, GRW, TA, LOSS, and YEAR. SIZE was 
calculated using the natural log value of total assets, and its mean and median are 10.3886 and 10.3240, respectively. 
Their spread is minimal. The mean and median of LEV are 1.7218 and 1.2132, respectively, indicating that the 
average LEV of the companies reflects 172% of liabilities against total equities. The means of ROA and GRW are 
.0380 and .075, respectively, indicating that the average ROA is 3.8% and that the average total asset growth rate is 
7.51%. The mean of TA is –.0385. The mean of LOSS is .1534; that is, 15.34% of the observations reflected net 
losses for the companies. 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – March/April 2017 Volume 33, Number 2 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 335 The Clute Institute 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Major Variables 
Variables Names Mean SD Median Minimum Maximum 
Dependent 
Variables 
DA .0001 .1019 .0133 -.49 .25 
REM .0001 .0584 .0114 -.20 .11 
ACFO .0001 .1019 -.0053 -.25 .55 
APC .0001 .0748 .0748  -.21 .16 
ASGA .0001 .0699 -.0208 -.11 .27 
Independent 
Variables 
OI .0478 .3928 .0514 -.12 .15 
DEBT .1925 .1075 .1574 .00 .62 
CFO .0780 .1075 .0589 -.15 .63 
Control 
Variables 
SIZE 10.3886 .2973 10.324 9.86 11.45 
LEV 1.7218 1.4568 1.2132 .15 7.63 
ROA .0380 .0675 .0357 -.33 .22 
GRW .0751 .1785 .0512 -.27 1.04 
TA -.0385 .1089 -.0243 -.59 .25 
LOSS .1534 .3614 .000 .000 1.000 
Definition for variables 
DA : Discretionary accruals, REM : Real earnings management, ACFO : Abnormal cash flows from operations, APC : Abnormal production 
costs, ASGA : Abnormal selling, general and administrative expenses, OI :  operating income ( operating income/Sales), CFO : Cash flows from 
operations (CFO/Beginning total assets), SIZE : Company size(Natural log value of beginning total assets), LEV : Liabilities to equity(Total 
liabilities/Net assets), ROA : Return of total assets(Net income/Beginning total assets), GRW : Total assets growth{(Ending total assets-
Beginning total assets)/Beginning total assets}, TA : Prior year total accruals{(Prior year net income-Prior year cash flows from operations)/Prior 
year beginning total assets}, LOSS : Net losses(Dummy variable, Net losses=1, Otherwise=0). 
 
 
Table 2 presents Pearson's correlation analysis result among variables used in the study. 
 
Table 2 presents the results of the Pearson’s correlation analysis of the variables. The DA and REM of the 
dependent variables show a statistically and highly positive significance of .550 at the 1% level, demonstrating that 
the DA and REM move in the same direction. OI shows a significant negative correlation (–.259) with REM at 1% 
but a non-significant negative correlation (–.135) with DA. This result suggests that companies with low operating 
incomes tend to more aggressively implement real earnings management than do enterprises with high operating 
incomes. This implication, however, does not apply to DA. DEBT does not show a statistically significant 
relationship with DA or REM, and CFO shows a significant negative correlation with both DA (–.896) and REM (–
.615) at the 1% level. Companies with low cash generation more aggressively implement earnings management 
through both accruals and real earnings activities. 
 
The correlation between OI and CFO is significant (.300) at the 1% level. OI moves in the same direction as CFO. 
DEBT exhibits a statistically non-significant relationship with CFO but a statistically significant relationship with 
operating income at the 5% level. We also tested multicollinearity on the basis of tolerance and VIF and found that 
the values fall within the acceptable range. 
 
 
Table 2. Pearson Correlations among Variables 
 DA REM OI DEBT CFO SIZE LEV ROA GRW TA LOSS 
DA 1.000           
REM .550** 1.000          
OI -.135 -.259** 1.000         
DEBT .039 .038 -.167* 1.000        
CFO -.896** -.615** .300** -.121 1.000       
SIZE .001 .045 -.015 -.094 -.121 1.000      
LEV -.006 .075 .217** .750** -.053 -.120 1.000     
ROA .083 -.135 .584** -.405** .246** -.115 -.411** 1.000    
GRW .011 -.095 .058 .050 .155* -.220** .028 .234** 1.000   
TA .071 .013 .027 .186* -.047 .055 -.146 .040 .076 1.000  
LOSS -.074 .129 -.542** .119 -.129 .077 .228** -.628** -.142 -.117 1.000 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
Variable definition is same with that of bottom of Table 1 
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4.2 Regression Analyses Results 
 
4.2.1 Test Results on Effects of Cash Flows from Operations on Earnings Management 
 
Table 3 presents the results of the hierarchical regression analysis for Hypothesis 1, which revolves around the 
effects of CFO on earnings management in the Korean RMC companies during the analysis period. In step one, we 
used various control variables. Table 3 shows only the results of step 2 given space limitations. CFO’s effects on DA 
and REM are statistically significant at the 0.1% level. The R2 values of DA and REM are .917 and .388, 
respectively. These values explain 92% of the DA and 39% of the REM. The tolerance of the variables and the VIF 
are close to 1, indicating the near-absence of multicollinearity. 
 
The coefficient of CFO as an independent variable for DA and REM are –.939 and –.340, respectively, and both 
negative values are statistically significant at the 0.1% level. This finding implies that companies with low cash 
generation tend to more aggressively implement AEM and REM than do companies with high cash generation. Most 
of the effects of the control variables, except TA and LOSS, on DA are statistically significant at the 0.1% to 1% 
level. However, their effects on REM are statistically non-significant, indicating that CFO is the key explanatory 
factor in REM.  
 
 
Table 3. Regression Results on Effects of Operating Cash Flows on Earnings Management 
Input Variables DA REM Tolerance VIF B t B t 
Constant .247 2.947** .063 .480   
SIZE -.003 -2.474* -.004 -.358 .916 1.092 
LEV .005 2.862** .002 .907 .773 1.293 
ROA .512 10.512*** .096 1.268 .476 2.103 
GRW .040 2.963** -.005 -.261 .881 1.135 
TA .019 .885 .002 .051 .949 1.054 
LOSS .003 .390 .017 1.325 .594 1.683 
Year Dummy Included Included   
CFO -.939 -42.710*** -.340 -9.936*** .920 1.087 
R2(△R2) .917(.903) .388(.360)   
F 264.616*** 15.227***   
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
Variable definition is same with that of bottom of Table 1 
 
 
4.2.2 Test Results on Effects of Operating Income on Earnings Management 
 
Table 4 presents the hierarchical regression analysis results for Hypothesis 2, which revolves around the effects of 
OI on earnings management in the RMC companies. As with the analysis for Hypothesis 1, step 1 involved the use 
of various control variables, but Table 4 shows only the results of step 2 because of space limitations. With respect 
to DAs, excluding the effects of the control variables, OI’s contribution to the overall explanation for DAs is 
statistically significant at 1%. The tolerance level of the variables is closer to 1 than 0, and their VIF level is nearer 
to 1 than 10. These values demonstrate the near-absence of multicollinearity.  
 
The coefficient of OI is –.825 and is statistically significant at the 1% level, showing that companies with high 
operating incomes practice earnings management to a lesser extent through DA. The coefficient of ROA is .349 and 
is significant at the 5% level. The OI coefficient of REM is –.432. This value is significant at the 1% level, 
indicating that low operating incomes tend to drive more aggressive real earnings management. No other variable 
exhibits statistical significance at the 5% level. 
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Table 4. Regression Results on Effects of OI on Earnings Management 
Input Variables DA REM Tolerance VIF B t B t 
Constant -.065 -.233 -.053 -.333   
SIZE .009 .337 .007 .444  .917 1.090 
LEV .004 .721 .002 .691  .772 1.295 
ROA .349 2.030* .071 .725 .424 2.359 
GRW -.024 -.530 -.031 -1.195 .880 1.136 
TA .063 .886 .017 .415  .952 1.051 
LOSS -.032 -1.148 .000 -.019  .549 1.822 
Year Dummy Included Included   
OI -.825 -3.315** -.432 -3.035** .599 1.669 
R2(△R2) .074(.061) .079(.050)   
F 1.931 2.063*   
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
Variable definition is same with that of bottom of Table 1 
 
 
4.2.3 Test Results on Moderating Effects of Operating Income on the Relationship between Operating Cash Flows 
and Earnings Management 
 
Table 5 presents the effects of CFO on earnings management, which vary depending on OI level (low and high). The 
effects are divided into two groups on the basis of the average OI. We used hierarchical regression analysis, and in 
step 1, employed various control variables. Table 5 presents only the step 2 results because of space limitations. The 
coefficients of CFO on DA are –.927 for the low operating income group and –.942 for the high operating income 
group. Given that these negative values are statistically significant at the 0.1% level, companies with low cash 
generation more aggressively implement AEM than do companies with high cash generation, regardless of OI level. 
The coefficients of CFO on REM are –.290 and –.358 for the low and high operating income groups, respectively. 
These negative values are also statistically significant at the 0.1% level, identical to the results for the DA case.  
 
  
The Journal of Applied Business Research – March/April 2017 Volume 33, Number 2 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 338 The Clute Institute 
Table 5. Effects of OI level on the relations between CFO and Earnings Management Depending 
Dependent 
Variables Input Variables 
Operating Income 
Below Mean(OI=0) Above Mean(OI=1) 
B T B t 
DA 
Constant .340 4.054*** .014 .082 
SIZE -.027 -3.457*** .001  .050 
LEV .001 .730 .012  2.969** 
ROA .355 5.582*** .669  7.50*** 
GRW .041 2.964** .013  .461 
TA .043 1.417 .008  .243 
LOSS -.002 -.300 -.011  -.435 
Year Dummy Included Included 
CFO -.927 -29.772*** -.943  -26.656*** 
R2(△R2) .912(.841) .931(.728) 
F 137.332*** 129.898*** 
REM 
Constant .072 .431 .088  .406 
SIZE -.005 -.292 -.009  -.427 
LEV .001 .226 .007 1.404 
ROA .114 .902 .189  1.701 
GRW -.013 -.473 -.015  -.405 
TA -.006 -.099 -.008 -.193 
LOSS .016 1.004 .020  .611 
Year Dummy Included Included 
CFO -.290 -4.688*** -.358 -8.107*** 
R2(△R2) .229(.182) .521(.470) 
F 3.946*** 10.406*** 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
Operating income (OM) is a dummy variable (0: Below average, 1: Above average) and definition for other variables are same with that of 
bottom of Table 1 
 
 
By hierarchical regression analysis, we verified Hypothesis 3, which centers on the moderating effects of OI on the 
relationship between CFO and earnings management. The results are summarized in Table 6. In step 1, we used 
various control variables, but Table 6 shows only the results of steps 2 to 4 given space limitations. With regard to 
the DA in model 1, R2 is 93.1% when CFO is used as the independent variable. This value increases to 93.3% to 
93.6% when additional moderating variables, that is, OI and the combined effects of OI and CFO, are used. 
However, the combined effects are statistically non-significant for DA. In the case of the REM in model 1, R2 is 52.1% 
when CFO is employed as the independent variable, after which this value increases to 54.4% to 58.2% when 
additional moderating variables, that is, OI and the combined effects of OI and CFO, are used. In contrast to the DA 
case, the REM case exhibits a combined effect that is statistically significant at the 5% level. This finding indicates 
that OI exerts a moderating effect on cash flows for real earnings management.  
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Table 6. Moderating Effects of OI on the relation between CFO and Earnings Management 
Dependent 
Variables Input Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
B t B t B t 
DA 
Constant .014 .082 .070 .391 .009 -.051 
SIZE .001 .050 -.003 -.156 .003 .160 
LEV .012 2.969** .011 2.812** .012 3.002** 
ROA .669 7.500*** .715 7.461*** .750 7.745*** 
GRW .013 .461 .010 .355 -.002 -.084 
TA .008 .243 .010 .312 .009 .290 
LOSS -.011 -.435** .000 .002 .004 .150 
CFO -.943 -26.656*** -26.784*** 1.272 -.706 -4.761 
OI   -1.269 1.266 .022 .082 
CFO X OI    .794 3.247 -1.674 
R2(△R2) .931(.728) .933(.002) .936(.003) 
F 129.898*** 114.898*** 105.234*** 
REM 
Constant .088 .406 .186 .845 .325 1.480 
SIZE -.009 -.427 -.015 -.722 -.024 -1.195 
LEV .007 1.404 .006 1.204 .005 1.022 
ROA .189 1.701 .270 2.283* .208 1.782 
GRW -.015 -.405 -.020 -.563 .002 .066 
TA -.008 -.193 -.004 -.098 -.002 -.062 
LOSS .020 .611 .040 1.181 .033 .259  
CFO -.358 -8.107*** -.365 -8.373*** -.789 -4.420*** 
OI   -.479 -1.815 -.997 -3.011** 
CFO X OI     5.710 2.445* 
R2(△R2) .521(.470) .544(.023) .582(.038) 
F  10.406*** 9.829*** 10.060*** 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
Variable definition is same with that of bottom of Table 1 
 
 
4.2.4 Test Results on Effects of Debt Dependency on Earnings Management 
 
Table 7 presents the results of hierarchical regression analysis for Hypothesis 4, which pertains to the effects of 
DEBT on earnings management in the RMC companies. Again, step 1 involved various control variables, and only 
the results of step 2 are presented in the table because of space limitations. The tolerance levels of all the variables 
are closer to 1 than 0, and their VIF levels are closer to 1 than 10, demonstrating that almost no multicollinearity 
issue occurred in our analysis.  
 
All the variables for DA and REM are statistically non-significant at 5%. This finding differs from those of previous 
studies. Most of such studies showed that debt dependency level affects earnings management for DA and REM. 
Jelinek (2007), however, suggested that increased leverage is related to a reduction in earnings management. Thus, 
the effects of leverage on earnings management may need additional study in the context of the RMC industry. 
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Table 7. Regression Results on Effects of Debts Dependency on Earnings Management 
Input Variables 
DA REM 
Tolerance VIF 
B t B t 
Constant -.058 -.203 -.043 -.260   
SIZE .004 .159 .004 .261 .920 1.087 
LEV -.003 -.398 .003 .594 .411 2.431 
ROA .198 1.153 -.047 -.482 .449 2.227 
GRW -.016 -.350 -.023 -.861 .877 1.140 
TA .082 1.111 .017 .412 .926 1.080 
LOSS .002 .069 .012 -.739 .558 1.791 
DEBT .081 1.191 -.011 -.279 .390 2.565 
Year Dummy Included Included   
R2(△R2) .022(.008) .029(.00)   
F .545 .719   
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
This study was aimed at examining the major relationships between key financial indicators, such as cash flows 
from operations, operating income, and debt dependency level, and earnings management in the RMC industry in 
Korea. We used 176 firm-year observations as bases in the analyses and verified the moderating effects of operating 
income on the relationship between operating cash flows and earnings management. We used the model of Kothari 
et al. (2005) as a proxy for AEM and the model put forward by Cohen et al. (2008) as a proxy for REM. 
 
We developed four hypotheses, for which the test results are as follows. First, cash flows from operations are 
statistically significant at the 0.1% level for both AEM and REM. Companies with low cash generation exhibit a 
stronger tendency toward upward earnings management in AEM and REM. Second, the RMC companies’ operating 
income levels affect AEM and REM at statistically significant levels. Companies with low operating incomes also 
exhibit a high potential to adopt upward earnings management. Third, operating income exerts different moderating 
effects on the relationship between operating cash flows and earnings management. That is, no statistical 
significance was found for AEM, whereas statistical significance at the 5% level was found for REM. Fourth, the 
RMC companies’ debt dependency levels are statistically non-significant for AEM and REM—a result that deviates 
from those of previous studies. 
 
This study shows that incentives for implementing upward earnings management in AEM and REM differ 
depending on financial indicators. Looking into operating income and cash flows from operations enabled us to 
determine the possibilities that characterize earnings engagement by RMC companies in Korea. When companies 
have low operating cash flows and operating incomes, they implement both AEM and REM, regardless of their debt 
dependency levels. Unlike previous studies, the present work determined that debt dependency level is statistically 
non-significant for both AEM and REM in Korea’s RMC industry. In their study on the Korean construction waste 
disposal industry, Kim and Lee (2015) showed that companies with high debt dependency levels tend to more 
aggressively pursue AEM. Overall, the companies examined in the current research implement aggressive earnings 
management, but this decision depends more on operating income and cash generation ability than on debt 
dependency. As the first study on earnings management in Korea’s RMC industry, this research’s results can 
provide insights for those who are interested in accounting information on the aforementioned industry.  
 
Similar to other studies, this research also has certain limitations. We used only 176 firm-year observations because 
a small number of companies in Korea’s RMC industry disclose their financial conditions on the Korean SEC 
website. Accordingly, this limits the generalizability of our findings. Researchers can expand our work by including 
more data as the Korean government strengthens its financial disclosure system. For data purity, we excluded 
companies that engage in businesses other than RMC. The robustness of research in this context can be strengthened 
by including RMC companies that are multi-business enterprises. Researchers can also extend earnings management 
study to other industries for comparison and for the identification of characteristics that are unique to the earnings 
management practices of Korea’s RMC industry. 
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